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The scope of reference of a word’s meaning can be highly variable. We present a
novel paradigm to investigate the flexible interpretation of word meaning. We focus on
quantifiers such as “many” or “few,” a class of words that depends on number knowledge
but can be interpreted in a flexible manner. Healthy young adults performed a truth value
judgment task on pictorial arrays of varying amounts of blue and yellow circles, deciding
whether the sentence “Many/few of the circles are yellow” was an adequate description
of the stimulus. The study consisted of two experiments, one focusing on “many,” one
on “few.” Each experiment had three blocks. In a first “baseline” block, each individual’s
criterion for “many” and “few” was assessed. In a second “adaptation” block, subjects
received feedback about their decisions that was different from their initial judgments in an
effort to evaluate the flexibility of a subject’s interpretation. A third “test” block assessed
whether adaptation of quantifier meaning induced in block 2 then was generalized to
alter a subject’s baseline meaning for “many” and “few.” In Experiment 1, a proportion of
yellow circles as small as 40% was reinforced as “many”; in Experiment 2, a proportion of
yellow circles as large as 60%was reinforced as “few.” Subjects learned the new criterion
for “many” in Experiment 1, which also affected their criterion for “few” although it had
never been mentioned. Likewise, in Experiment 2, subjects changed their criterion for
“few,” with a comparable effect on the criterion for “many” which was not mentioned.
Thus, the meaning of relational quantifiers like “many” and “few” is flexible and can
be adapted. Most importantly, adapting the criterion for one quantifier (e.g., “many”)
also appeared to affect the reciprocal quantifier (in this case, “few”). Implications of this
result for psychological interventions and for investigations of the neurobiology of the
language-number interface are discussed.
Keywords: semantics, quantifiers, decision-making, numerosity, flexibility, learning
Introduction
Humans are very efficient at processing quantities. Assessing and evaluating the number of desir-
able or potentially dangerous entities—chunks of food, precious artifacts, or deadly animals—
happens in fractions of seconds. Importantly, we are also able to share these rapid impressions
with others: Concrete quantities or abstract symbolic representations can be translated into number
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words (cf. Dehaene et al., 2003) or, similarly, other number-
describing expressions, so-called quantifiers (e.g., “many,” “at
least five,” etc.).
Quantifiers can take the form of different semantic classes.
On the one hand, there are cardinal quantifiers (“three bottles”)
which contain an explicit numeric expression (in our example:
three). There are also other classes of quantifiers that refer to
quantity with an implicit notion of quantity that do not refer to
an exact number or numeric interval. For instance, Aristotelian
quantifiers (comprising existential quantifiers such as “all X are
Y” and logical quantifiers like e.g., “some X are Y”) or majority
quantifiers (“at least half of the X are Y”) refer to quantities in
the environment in the absence of an explicitly defined number.
Items in the environment may be defined by the total size of a set:
If there are 12 oranges, for example, “at least half of the oranges”
means more than 6. However, in other cases, the criterion may
be defined more vaguely. For instance, “much chocolate” may
mean one bar or five bars, depending on the individual’s pref-
erence. Likewise, it may depend on the semantic context: “many
lions” could be five, but “many ants” probably means hundreds
or thousands. We focus our study on quantifiers because we
can easily and precisely measure the meaning of this class of
word, even one that does not explicitly mention a number. This
is because the meaning of a quantifier is derived in part from
number knowledge—to varying degrees depending on the exact
nature of the quantifier.
Majority quantifiers refer to a subset of items that require a
computation based on an understanding of the entire set of items
and thus tend to be more difficult than cardinal quantifiers where
an explicit number is mentioned. For instance, children use
number expressions much earlier, and far more correctly, than
quantifiers (Hurewitz et al., 2007; Sullivan and Barner, 2011). In
particular, the appropriate use of quantifiers is not always easy.
Consider the sentence “All shirts are blue.” If this sentence is true,
then the sentence “Some shirts are blue” is, logically, also true
(cf. Geurts, 2003). This phenomenon is called scalar implicature,
indicating that if the truth value for a set of elements is 1, then it is
also 1 for any given subset. However, as Grice (1967) pointed out,
this is not how we use quantifier expressions in every-day con-
versation. Rather, we use “conversational implicatures,” trying to
be as relevant as possible (for a discussion see Haugh, 2002). In
the given example, this would mean that we distinguish between
“some” and “all” such that “some” means “only some, not all.”
This Gricean use of quantifiers can be demonstrated empiri-
cally in the laboratory: Different quantifiers are used to refer to
different ranges of numerosities (e.g., Oaksford et al., 2002). For
a given set of objects, “none” refers to the lower end of the scale,
followed by “few,” “some,” “some not,” “most,” and “all” in ascend-
ing order. This order was reliably observed with different tasks,
indicating that a given quantifier is most appropriate, and thus
most informative, for a certain fraction of the overall numerosity.
However, the distinction between scopes of quantifiers is not
completely clear-cut. Rather, scopes of quantifiers tend to over-
lap partially (e.g., Holyoak and Glass, 1978; Oaksford et al., 2002).
This may lead to situations in which two quantifiers are (nearly)
equally appropriate for the description of a given amount of enti-
ties. For instance, in the Oaksford et al. (2002) study, participants
were presented with images containing varying amounts of black
or white squares, together with a statement like “Most of the
squares are black.” Their task was to decide whether the state-
ment was an appropriate description of the visual scenario.When
there were about 18% of black squares on the screen, subjects
accepted the statement “Few of the squares are black” in about
75% of the cases. Interestingly, when presented with the same
scenario but the sentence “Some of the squares are black,” they
would accept the statement in exactly the same proportion of
cases. Compatible results were found in a memory experiment
by Holyoak and Glass (1978) who demonstrated that quantifiers
like “many” and “a few” might be confused in memory in some
proportion of cases, the chance being higher as the quantities
and the referring quantifiers became more similar. To summa-
rize, the evidence suggests that the selection of quantifiers for
every-day use seems to follow the Gricean principle of relevance,
maximizing the information expressed by this quantifier. Such
specific selection is possible because each quantifier has a par-
ticular scope, i.e., it refers to a certain interval of probabilities
distributed around one criterion value which best represents the
semantics of the quantifier. These scopes overlap at least in part.
Given this overlap of scopes and the fact that quantifiers
may be exchanged under some circumstances, a question arises
regarding the invariance of the criteria to which quantifiers refer
in an individual. Given the close relationship between processing
of numbers and numerosities on the one hand and quantifiers
on the other hand, findings from studies of number processing
may shed some light on this question. Both behavioral and neu-
rophysiological studies (e.g., Nieder and Miller, 2003; Piazza and
Izard, 2009) indicate that processing of numerosities is not an
all-or-nothing phenomenon. Rather, even if a presented number
of elements does not exactly match a target numerosity, neural
assemblies may also fire to these if they are close enough to the
target numerosity, resulting in the subject to show overt behav-
ioral responses to this slightly deviant numerosity. For instance,
Piazza and Izard (2009) summarize a series of studies in monkeys
and human subjects who performed same-different judgment
tasks on stimuli with dot patterns. Intracortical recordings in
parietal neurons in monkeys showed the firing pattern described
above, which nicely corresponded to the distribution of the per-
centage of “same” responses in the monkeys. In human subjects,
fMRI was used instead of intracortical recordings, yielding again
a nice match between button press responses and the shape of the
BOLD response in the left parietal cortex around the intraparietal
sulcus.
Most interestingly, these behavioral responses are not invari-
ant. In his seminal work, Helson (1948) demonstrated that the
repeated exposure to a certain stimulus intensity, or numeros-
ity, may result in a change of what he called “adaptation level.”
Responses to the former target intensities, or numerosities, are
thus altered, leading to a so-called peak shift in the response
curves. The maximum probability of a YES response is moved
toward a new criterion.
Following the argument above that the processing of quan-
tifiers and numbers bears some similarities, one might assume
that such a peak shift phenomenon can occur not only for num-
ber processing, but also for quantifier processing. In other words,
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some external learning influence is likely to change the internal
criterion to which a quantifier refers, resulting in a shift of the
scope of this quantifier. It is yet an open question whether such
a phenomenon may occur. If so, another question follows: Does
the scope of this one quantifier shift in isolation, or does it also
affect the scope of other quantifiers? In particular, a change in
the criterion for “many” affect the mental representation of the
related quantifier “few?” If true, this would provide some support
for the claim that quantifiers like “many” and “few” are linked
in their representations in semantic memory even though these
terms refer to different quantities (cf. Routh, 1994).
The present study was thus conducted in order to address
these two questions. For this purpose, we used the seman-
tic truth value judgment (STVJ) task by Heim et al. (2012)
and combined it with explicit feedback trials as e.g., used by
McMillan et al. (2012). As a result, we were able to assess
the initial criteria to which the quantifiers “many” and “few”
refer, to train subjects to change their internal criteria for
“many-ness” (Experiment 1) or “few-ness” (Experiment 2) inde-
pendently from each other, and to test whether explicitly altering
the one criterion (e.g., for “many”) would also affect cri-
terion for the other, untrained quantifier (in this case, for
“few”). We used the quantifiers “many” and “few” because
they are familiar, they do not differ in processing requirements
(see above), and at the same time they are sufficiently dis-
tant from each other (Routh, 1994) to be not mistaken too
easily.
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to assess the subjects’ initial
criteria for calling a certain amount of circles of a given color
“many” or “few” (Block 1), then to shift the criterion for “many”
explicitly to a lower proportion of circles (Block 2), and finally
to test whether this shift also affected the criterion for “few” even
though the criterion for this quantifier was not mentioned (Block
3). All subjects participated in an informed consent procedure
that was approved by an Institutional Review Board convened at
the University of Pennsylvania.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-one healthy volunteers (mean age 22.7 years, range 19–
29 years; 13 women; average amount of education: 15.8 years)
participated in this study. They were recruited at the University
of Pennsylvania and received $10 for their participation.
Procedure
Subjects were presented with pictures showing isoluminant blue
and yellow circles on a gray background. The stimuli were taken
from the study byHeim et al. (2012). Each stimulus item included
a picture containing 50 circles, with proportions of yellow circles
ranging from 20/30/40/50/60/70% of the total number of circles.
The remaining circles were blue. There were six different stimuli
for each proportion. In order to minimize learning effects due to
repetition of stimuli, each stimulus was presented in three differ-
ent rotations (0◦, 90◦, 180◦), a procedure that had previously been
shown to reduce repetition memory effects for stimuli (Lassaline
and Logan, 1993).
Each picture was presented together with the sentence “Many
of the circles are yellow” or “Few of the circles are yellow.”
The subjects performed a truth value judgment task, indicat-
ing whether they thought the sentence adequately described the
picture or not by pressing the left or right response button1.
The experiment consisted of three blocks (cf. Figure 1). The
first block served as a baseline block, in which the subjects’ inter-
nal criteria for “many” and “few” were assessed. To this end,
subjects performed the STVJ task in a total of 378 trials counter-
balanced for “few” and “many” trials along with the proportion
of yellow circles. After this baseline block, an adaptation block
followed in which subjects received feedback for their response.
In this block, we provided feedback and only stimuli with the
quantifier “many” were presented. Positive feedback was given
if they responded YES to pictures containing 40% or more of
yellow circles, or NO to pictures with less than 40% of yellow
circles. Negative feedback was given if they responded NO to pic-
tures with 40% or more, or YES to less than 40% yellow circles.
Based on previous data (Heim et al., 2012), this feedback would
effectively move the internal criterion from a presumed baseline
of 50-60% down to 40%. For this adaptation block for “many,”
proportions of 20–70% yellow circles were used.
The adaptation block consisted of 162 trials, which were orga-
nized to form three sub-blocks with equal amounts of trials of
each proportion. Sub-dividing the adaptation block into these
three homogeneous sub-blocks allowed us to assess the learning
curve over the adaptation block with more precision by allow-
ing us to analyze each sub-block independently. Proportions were
distributed equally over the first, second, and third part of the
adaptation phase, thus creating three parallel sub-blocks of 54
trials each (9 trials for each of the 6 proportions).
After the adaptation block, the test block was administered.
This was identical to the baseline block, i.e., sentences contain-
ing “many” or “few” were presented, and no feedback was given.
The test block was run to assess whether and how the internal cri-
terion for “many” had been changed during the explicit training
block for “many,” and whether the criterion for “few” had been
altered in parallel even though “few” had never been presented in
the adaptation block.
Prior to the real experiment, all subjects were familiarized with
the stimuli and task in two short blocks, one without feedback
that resembled the baseline or test phase, and one with feedback
as in the adaptation phase.
The timing of a baseline/test trial is illustrated in Figure 1A.
First, a written sentence (“Many of the circles are yellow” or
“Few of the circles are yellow”) was shown in the upper third
of the screen for 3 s. The sentence stayed on for another 1.5 s
while the stimulus picture containing yellow and blue circles
appeared at the center of the screen for the same amount of
time. The words “YES” and “NO” were written in the lower third
1The assignment of the YES andNO responses to the one or other button were kept
constant for each single subject for the duration of the entire experiment. Across
subjects, the assignment of YES or NO to the left or right button was balanced.
Thus, 50% of the subjects pressed the left button for YES and the right for NO and
vice versa for the other 50%.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic of the trials in blocks 1 and 3 (top) and in the adaptation block 2 (bottom).
of the screen to indicate which button to push for which deci-
sion. Finally, the screen went blank for another 1.5 s before the
next trial began. Responses were recorded from the onset of the
picture and through the entire blank period.
The trials in the adaptation phase are illustrated in Figure 1B
and were similar to those in the baseline/test phase, with the
exception that feedback was given in these trials. If the subjects
responded correctly, they received 10 points which were added to
their score. False responses were penalized by deducting 10 points
from their score. The feedback screen consisted either of a green
arrow pointing upward and the information “+10” in green font,
or a downward red arrow and the text “−10” in red font. The ini-
tial score was “+100.” The actual score was always presented in
the middle of the very upper part of the screen in black font. The
adaptation phase consisted of 162 trials. Proportions were dis-
tributed equally over the first, second, and third portions of the
adaptation phase, thus creating three parallel sub-blocks of 54 tri-
als each (9 trials for each of the 6 proportions). These sub-blocks
could then be compared in order to test how quickly the subjects
learned.
Data Analysis
Because of the balanced assignment of YES/NO responses to the
left/right response button, the subjects’ button press responses
were first recoded into “1” (YES) or “0” (NO) to make data sets
comparable. Next, these acceptability ratings were aggregated per
subject, experimental block, quantifier, and proportion of circles
of the target color. Consequently, a 2 × 2 × 6 ANOVA with
factors BLOCK (baseline/test), QUANTIFIER (many/few), and
PROPORTION (20/30/40/50/60/70) was run to test for differ-
ential learning effects for the trained vs. untrained quantifier at
trained vs. untrained proportions. Subsequently, planned con-
trasts (paired t-tests) were computed to compare the change
in acceptability ratings at the critical proportion “40%” for the
trained and the untrained quantifier. In a second analysis, we also
tested how quickly the subjects learned during the adaptation
phase. To this end, data of the adaptation block were collapsed
over subject, sub-block, quantifier, and proportion. Paired t-tests
(sub-blocks 1 vs. 2, 2 vs. 3, and 1 vs. 3) were run to compare the
acceptability ratings at the critical proportion “40%.” We used
one-tailed t-tests because of our a priori predictions.
Results
Adaptation Effects
The 2×2×6 ANOVA yielded significant main effects for BLOCK
[F(1, 20) = 28.69; p < 0.001] and PROPORTION [F(5, 16) = 5.50;
p = 0.004] but not for QUANTIFIER [F(1, 20) < 1]. Moreover,
all two- and three-way interactions were significant [QUANTI-
FIER × BLOCK: F(1, 20) = 34.39; p < 0.001; QUANTIFIER ×
PROPORTION: F(5, 16) = 1362.62; p < 0.001; BLOCK × PRO-
PORTION: F(5, 16) = 4.24; p = 0.012; BLOCK × QUANTI-
FIER× PROPORTION: F(5, 16) = 9.73; p < 0.001]. These effects
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demonstrate a strong adaptation effect for the trained quantifier
“many,” and most importantly, we also observed a transfer effect
for the not trained quantifier “few” (Figure 2A).
Testing the adaptation effect for “many” and “few” at the crit-
ical proportion “40%” illustrates this overall effect (Figure 2B).
We found a highly significant increase in acceptability for “many”
[t(20) = −7.79; p < 0.001], and a decrease for “few” [t(20) = 2.58;
p = 0.018] (one-tailed t-tests, p-Bonferroni-corrected).
Learning during the Adaptation Phase
Testing the learning effect for “many” in block 2 yielded on-going
adaptation (Figure 3). This effect was significant from sub-block
1 to sub-block 3 [t(20) = −7.75; p < 0.001] as a result of increases
from sub-block 1 to sub-block 2 [t(20) = −5.03; p < 0.001] and
from sub-block 2 to sub-block 3 [t(20) = −1.83; p = 0.042; all
tests one-tailed, uncorrected for multiple comparisons].
Discussion
In this study we investigated whether individuals can flexibly
adapt their interpretation of quantifier meaning. Moreover, we
tested whether such change could affect the criterion of an
untrained quantifier as well, thus indicating a shift in the entire
semantic reference frame for numerosities. For both research
questions we obtained positive evidence. Subjects were able to
shift their internal criterion for “many” toward the new ref-
erence criterion of “40%” following explicit training. A closer
examination of the dynamics of this change (Figure 3) revealed
FIGURE 2 | (A) Average acceptability ratings for a given proportion of circles
of the mentioned color, plotted separately for the quantifiers “many” (black
lines) and “few” (gray lines) in the baseline blocks (dashed lines) and the test
blocks after adaptation (solid lines). (B) Average acceptability ratings for a
critical proportion of circles of the mentioned color, plotted separately for
“many” (black bars) and “few” (gray bars) in the baseline blocks (dashed bars)
and the test blocks after adaptation (solid bars). *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
that learning actually happened quite rapidly, with substantial
changes in the acceptability ratings from the first third to the
second third of the adaptation phase. Most interestingly, the
comparison between baseline and test phase, which were abso-
lutely identical with respect to quantifiers, stimuli, and their pair-
ings, revealed that the internal criterion for the second quantifier
(“few”) had also shifted although it had not been mentioned in
the adaptation phase.
These findings have interesting implications. They suggest
that contextual influence such as explicit reinforcement can be
a driving force to shift the quantifier’s scope (cf. Price et al., 2014
for an extensive discussion of feedback mechanisms during the
estimation of quantities). Moreover, there is a change in the ref-
erence of the related quantifier “few,” even though this was not
explicitly mentioned during the adaptation phase. This suggests
that subjects’ learning was not limited to the superficial mapping
of a word to a stimulus, but that the concept underlying this con-
tinuum of quantifier word meaning was changed. The data are
consistent with the interpretation that the contextual appropri-
ateness of a quantifier (such as the untrained “few” in the present
study) depends on its relative position in the continuum of ref-
erence criteria: If a proportion of 40% circles of a given color
is best described as “many,” the initial tendency of a subject to
call 40% “few” cannot be maintained. If it were maintained, the
Gricean principle of maximized information would be violated
because two different quantifiers that are partly exclusive and that
are on different positions on the continuum of reference criteria
(Oaksford et al., 2002) would describe the same semantic reality.
Yet, the interpretation of this data set is limited in two ways.
First, a direct shift for the trained quantifier and a transfer for
the untrained quantifier were only observed for a decrease of the
criterion (from 50 to 40%), i.e., leftwards on the continuum of
reference criteria. Second, the trained quantifier “many” was pos-
itive. From earlier studies (e.g., Heim et al., 2012) it is known
that positive quantifiers such as “many,” “most,” or “more than
half” are easier to process than their negative counterparts, e.g.,
“few” or “less than half.” In line with cognitive load theories
(e.g., Bannert, 2002) one might assume that the learning transfer
observed in Experiment 1 would diminish if the cognitive load
associated with the quantifier would be higher, as it would be in
FIGURE 3 | Learning curves for the new meaning of “many” during the
adaptation phase (block 2) as a function of percent circles of the target
color, plotted separately for each of the three sub-blocks. The learning
effect at the trained proportion “40” is visible.
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the case of the negative quantifier “few.” This is because theremay
be reduced potential mental flexibility associated with a word
requiring increased cognitive load during processing. Therefore,
we conducted Experiment 2 in which the setting was changed
accordingly: Here we explicitly trained “few,” and then examined
whether a transfer effect would be observed for “many.” Second,
since the acceptability ratings for “few” in the baseline block of
Experiment 1 indicate ceiling effects at low proportions, the cri-
terion shift was now rightwards, i.e., toward the higher reference
criteria 50 and 60%.
Experiment 2
Thus, the questions in Experiment 2 were the following. (1) Can
the criterion of a negative quantifier like “few” (the scope of which
is on the mental number line below the criterion, e.g., “less than
half ” or “fewer than five,” not above as in the case of positive
quantifiers such as “many” or “more than half”) be changed in
a manner that is analogous to that of “many” in Experiment 1?
(2) Is there a generalization of this learning effect to the untrained
quantifier “many”? Again, all subjects participated in an informed
consent procedure that was approved by an Institutional Review
Board convened at the University of Pennsylvania.
Methods
The same subjects as in Experiment 1 completed another exper-
iment that was almost identical to Experiment 1. The only
difference was the following: In block 2 of Experiment 2, the sub-
jects were now trained to call proportions of 50% and 60% of
circles “few.” YES responses were encouraged for 60% or less yel-
low circles, while NO responses were reinforced for proportions
above 60% yellow circles. In Experiment 2, the proportion ranged
between 30 and 80% of circles of the target color. The order of
Experiments 1 and 2 were counterbalanced within a single exper-
imental session such that potential carry-over effects from one
experiment to the other could be controlled (10 subjects started
with Experiment 1, 11 started with Experiment 2). Analyses were
analogous to those in Experiment 1.
Results
Adaptation Effect
The 2×2× 6 ANOVA yielded significant main effects for BLOCK
[F(1, 20) = 5.82; p = 0.026] and QUANTIFIER [F(5, 16) = 78.67;
p < 0.001] and a trend for PROPORTION [F(1, 20) = 2.71;
p = 0.059]. Moreover, the following interaction terms were sig-
nificant (QUANTIFIER × BLOCK: F(1, 20) = 25.61; p < 0.001;
QUANTIFIER × PROPORTION: F(5, 16) = 763.71; p < 0.001;
BLOCK× QUANTIFIER× PROPORTION: F(5, 16) = 6.92; p =
0.001]. The interaction term for BLOCK × PROPORTION was
marginally significant [F(5, 16) = 2.43; p = 0.081]. These effects
describe a strong adaptation effect for the trained quantifier “few”
and a weaker transfer effect for the not trained quantifier “many”
(Figure 4A).
Testing the learning/transfer effect for “many” and “few”
at the critical proportion “50%” pinpoints this overall effect
(Figure 4B), showing a highly significant increase in acceptability
for “few” [t(20) = −5.49; p < 0.001] and a significant decrease
FIGURE 4 | (A) Average acceptability ratings for a given proportion of circles
of the mentioned color, plotted separately for the quantifiers “many” (black
lines) and “few” (gray lines) in the baseline blocks (dashed lines) and the test
blocks after adaptation (solid lines). (B) Average acceptability ratings for a
critical proportion of circles of the mentioned color, plotted separately for
“many” (black bars) and “few” (gray bars) in the baseline blocks (dashed bars)
and the test blocks after adaptation (solid bars). **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
for “many” [t(20) = 3.10; p = 0.006] (one-tailed t-tests, p-
Bonferroni-corrected). At proportion “60%,” there was again a
significant learning effect for “few” [t(20) = −2.90; p = 0.009]
but no effect for “many” [t(20) = 0.84; p = 0.411].
Learning during the Adaptation Phase
Testing the learning effect for “few” in the adaptation block
yielded on-going learning (Figure 5). This effect was significant
from sub-block 1 to sub-block 3 [t(20) = −3.57; p = 0.001] as
a result of a significant increase from sub-block 1 to sub-block 2
[t(20) = −2.55; p = 0.005] and a strong trend from sub-block
2 to sub-block 3 [t(20) = −1.67; p = 0.056; all tests one-tailed,
uncorrected for multiple comparisons].
Stronger Adaptation Effect for “many” (Experiment 1)
than for “few” (Experiment 2)
Next, in order to test whether the direct adaptation effect for
“few” observed in Experiment 2 was equal in size to that for
“many” in Experiment 1, we tested across experiments for the
interaction of BLOCK and trained QUANTIFIER at the respec-
tive critical proportions “40%” (for Experiment 1) and “50%” (for
Experiment 2). This interaction effect proved to be significant
[F(1, 20) = 4.44; p = 0.048], indicating that the adaptation effect
for “many” was larger in size than that for “few.”
No Effect of the Order of Experiments 1 and 2
Finally, in order to test whether the order in which the subjects
underwent the two experiments had any systematic influence
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FIGURE 5 | Learning curves for the new meaning of “few” during the
adaptation phase (block 2), plotted separately for each of the three
sub-blocks. Learning effects for proportions 50 and 60 are visible.
on the data pattern, we re-ran this analysis adding ORDER as
a between-subject factor. Neither the main effect of ORDER
[F(1, 19) = 1.10; p = 0.308) nor any 2-way or 3-way interaction
with ORDER was significant (all p > 0.05).
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we tested whether the pattern of results
from Experiment 1 would be mirrored in adaptation effects
for the negative quantifier “few” with a generalization to the
untrained quantifier “many.” The findings were straight-forward.
There was a clear learning effect for few at both trained pro-
portions “50%” and “60%” as well as a transfer to the cri-
terion for “many” at “50%.” Moreover, the in-depth analysis
of the learning curves in the three parts of the adaptation
block revealed again relatively rapid learning of the new crite-
rion from the first-third to the second-third of the adaptation
phase.
These data corroborate the initial findings and conclusions,
i.e., that a change in meaning of a quantifier may be contextually
induced and that this change in meaning may also affect related
quantifiers even if they are not exact opposites or antonyms.
The fact that the same subjects underwent both experiments pre-
cluded problems of between-group comparisons; the fact that the
order of experiments was counterbalanced over subject ensured
that the adaptation and transfer effects observed in Experiment 2
were not just a resetting to the subjects’ original criteria tempo-
rally shifted for the duration of Experiment 1. Still, we found that
the training for “many” elicited a stronger adaptation effect than
that for “few.” The implications of the overall pattern of results
will now be discussed in more detail.
General Discussion
In this paper we reported two experiments that tested whether
the meaning of a quantifier such as “many” or “few” can
be altered, and whether this would affect the meaning of
another, untrained quantifier as well. The findings were straight-
forward, with effects for explicit training as well as transfer
effects to the untrained quantifier for both quantifiers. These
findings emphasize the flexible representations of conceptual
knowledge.
These data have several implications for the field of quan-
tification and reasoning. For one, they suggest a certain flexi-
bility of our interpretation of quantifiers that depends in part
on the context. As in the introductory example, “many” can
imply different amounts of e.g., animals depending on whether
they are rare (“many lions” = 10) or not (“many ants” =
10,000), i.e., the semantic context in which it is used. As Sanford
and Moxey (e.g., in their 2003 paper) point out, quantifier use
may reflect the individual perspective on, or interpretation of,
a quantity rather than an inflexible, fixed characterization of
its magnitude. This is in line with the finding that quantifier
scopes partly overlap, as could be shown by Holyoak and Glass
(1978). These authors asked subjects to provide not only their
first choice of an appropriate quantifier but also their second
choice. They found for this latter task preference for quantifiers
with closest distance on the continuum (all—many—some—a
few—none).
However, the notion of a flexible, partly subjective perspec-
tive on quantifier meaning may not be true for quantifiers in
general. According to Routh (1994), one way of grouping quan-
tifiers is with respect to the degree of variability of the criterion
they refer to. Routh distinguished between “fuzzier quantifiers”
such as “few,” “several,” or “many” that are determined in part by
context, Aristotelean or logical quantifiers that are “more precise”
such as “all,” “none,” or “each,” and parity or majority quantifiers
that are “comparative” like “more” or “fewer.” This distinction is
based in part on the flexibility of the criteria for the referents of a
given quantifier. Whereas “many donuts” may be two for person
A and five for person B, comparative quantifiers imply at least
the imparity of sets, i.e., ordinal information about which set is
bigger. Most objective are quantifiers for which the criterion is
explicitly or implicitly named, as in the case of “at least 13” or
“more than half” (the latter referring to an amount of more than
50% of the total set)—objective in the sense that they refer to
an explicitly stated criterion or degree. Routh (1994) presented
evidence from clustering algorithms and multidimensional scal-
ing that this classification of quantifiers has psychological and
empirical reality and is thus effective in communication. Given
this distinction, one could formulate the hypothesis that the
observed changes for quantifier semantics in the present study
might generalize to other “fuzzy” quantifiers such as “some,” “a
few,” “several,” “quite a few,” etc.
Interestingly, within the class of “fuzzy quantifiers” like the
majority quantifiers “many” and “few” tested in the present
study, there seem to be differences between individual quantifiers.
Whereas we did observe adaptation of the meaning of both quan-
tifiers, we also found that this adaptation effect was even more
pronounced for “many” than for “few.” This result corresponds
to earlier reports in the literature (e.g., Routh, 1994; Geurts, 2003;
Heim et al., 2012; Shikhare et al., 2015) that quantifiers with
negative polarity are more difficult to process. There are various
accounts for this effect. One stresses that the positive quantifiers
are (unmarked) defaults whereas negative quantifiers are marked
(Clark, 1969; Clark and Chase, 1972). Alternatively, it has been
proposed that negative quantifiers refer more or less precisely
to the complement of the set denoted by a positive quantifier.
Thus, in order to obtain the correct representation of a negative
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quantifier, the expression about the original set has to be negated,
implying extra processing costs2. Much more work is required
here. Still, in the context of the present study, it could well be
that negation or markedness pose greater cognitive demands on
the comparison of a negative polarity quantifier like “few,” result-
ing in gradually smaller flexibility and thus a smaller adaptation
effect.
If the meaning of a “fuzzy quantifier” can be changed, the
question arises in how far such flexibility can also be found for
quantifiers that are less fuzzy, i.e., that have fixed criteria. While
the current study suggests that quantity can modulate quanti-
fier interpretation, there is also additional evidence suggesting
that object size, or mass, can modulate quantifier interpretation
(McMillan et al., 2013). The use of quantifiers with different
degrees of fuzziness in one experiment may restrict the flexibil-
ity of e.g., many and few that was observed here. Alternatively, it
could also be the case that shifts along the continuum of criteria
might even affect quantifiers with a fixed criterion: For instance,
in the case of “at least X,” subjects might be more inclined to
accept such a statement when the distance of the actual numeros-
ity to the criterion increases (cf. Shikhare et al., 2015, for first
results on distance effects related to “at least” and “at most”).
Our findings address the question of the flexibility of word
meaning, such as deciding when the diameter of a cup becomes
broad enough to be called a bowl. This has been a challenging
issue to address because of the difficulty quantifying the associ-
ated object concepts. Here we addressed this issue by examin-
ing quantifiers, a class of words that is based in part on number
knowledge. We found that word meaning is highly flexible. It is
trivial to re-label a concept, as in our explicit training paradigm.
However, we also found a shift in the meaning of untrained
words. This suggests a modification of word meaning at a deeper,
conceptual level. The mental flexibility allowing the development
of a modified meaning was not transient and determined by the
experimental paradigm, but appeared to be maintained through-
out the test block. Thus, in contrast to models of word meaning
that depend entirely on a set of fixed features (Locke) or reference
to an expert (Goodman), our findings are compatible with the
notion that a component of word meaning is associated in part
with a central tendency (Wittgenstein) that is somewhat flexible
in the reference of a word.
Another question that needs to be addressed in future research
is how long the criterion shift effect induced in the adaptation
phase actually lasts, i.e., how long it takes for the learning curve to
go back to baseline level. Any considerations of how to make use
of the observed effect in therapeutic settings wheremagnitudes or
amounts are being misevaluated by patients (as in additive disor-
ders or body schema disorders) will depend on its natural decay.
This decay may in part depend on working memory processes
2Note, however, that “few” is not exactly equivalent to “not many.” This is due to
the fact that these two quantifiers do not refer to the same reference, or criterion,
whatever its value may be in a given context and for a given individual. In the
example of peanuts, it is well possible that you neither eat few peanuts (i.e., a hand-
ful) nor many (i.e., the whole package), but just some intermediate amount. The
situation might be different for quantifiers that are exact opposites not by virtue of
explicit negation (“more than half”/“not more than half”) but of semantic polarity
(“more than half”/“less than half”).
which have been discussed as essential for quantifier processing
(McMillan et al., 2005; Zajenowski et al., 2014).
The present findings and the paradigm used to produce them
may be helpful in order to resolve a longer-standing debate about
the nature of the brain network underlying quantifier process-
ing. McMillan et al. (2005) found increasing involvement of the
left inferior frontal cortex in quantifiers with increasing process-
ing demands (“at least 3,” “all,” “some” vs. “less than half,” “odd,”
“even”) and related this effect to aspects of working memory
(see Wei et al., 2014, for comparable findings in Chinese). More
recently, Heim et al. (2012) reported two fronto-parietal net-
works for quantifier processing in the left hemisphere that were
neighboring but hardly overlapping. One of these networks was
related to the initial estimation of numerosities, the other to the
comparison with a criterion. Interestingly, only the frontal com-
ponent also showed systematic effects of processing quantifier
meaning, suggesting a functional segregation between the frontal
and the parietal components of the two networks. The paradigm
presented here may be useful to get deeper insights into the role
of the frontal component in order to understand in how far it is
involved in the processing of change of meaning during the adap-
tation phase and/ormaintenance of the newly learnedmeaning in
workingmemory and its decay. Thus, subsequent work both with
functional neuroimaging and also with patients with frontal or
parietal neurodegeneration is encouraged in order to identify the
neural basis of quantifier processing from the initial percept to
the final semantic evaluation. Some first steps into that direction
have been done by McMillan et al. (2013) and by Morgan et al.
(2011) in studies of patients with fronto-temporal and/or pos-
terior cortical disease. In accordance with Dehaene’s triple-code
model (Dehaene et al., 2003) it was again atrophy in the frontal
cortex that had a severe effect on the verbal code of numerosi-
ties. It is yet an open question whether it is the dysfunction of
parts of the frontal cortex itself, or rather dynamic diaschisis (i.e.,
alterations in the entire network of frontal and parietal areas, as
could be supposed based on Troiani et al., 2009) that thus affects
the neurobiology of the language-number interface in the human
brain.
Conclusion
The present study investigated quantifier processing in a set-
ting in which their meaning could be experimentally altered
for the course of the experiment. This novel paradigm yielded
results suggesting that, in order to be most highly informative, a
change in meaning in one quantifier generalizes also to that of
other quantifiers, i.e., to a larger referential frame. Future stud-
ies are required to test the usefulness and limits of this paradigm
behaviorally and with neuroimaging.
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